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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DARRELL DEVERE POULSON,
Petitioner-Appellant
-vs.-

Case No. 10208

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Defendant Darrell Devere Poulson was convicted of
murder in the first degree in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, Utah County, which conviction was affirmed by this
court. Subsequently, he petitioned for a writ of coram vobis
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, and
appeals from the dismissal of his petition.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On May 8, 1964, the petitioner filed an original writ of
coram vobis in the District Court, Utah County, and accompanied the petition by an affidavit of Ija Korner, Ph.D.
On May 13, and May 21, 1964, a hearing was held upon
the petition and on June 5, 1964, the Honorable R. L.
Tuckett, Judge, denied the writ of coram vobis.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the petition was properly
denied and that the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent adopts the designation of the transcript
of original proceedings "T" and the transcript on the petition for extraordinary relief "R" as set forth in the appellant's brief. The respondent will refer to pleadings filed as
a part of the petition for writ of coram vobis as "P."
Respondent submits the following statement of facts.
On Saturday, February 16, 1961, the appellant Darrell
Devere Poulson, killed and raped Karen Mechling in
American Fork, Utah (T. 20, Exhibit 5). The appellant's
defense at the time of trial was a claim of insanity. The only
evidence tending to support the testimony at the time of
trial was offered by Mr. lja Korner, a psychologist who
examined the appellant on one occasion for 27'2 hours during which time he gave the appellant a few psychological
tests (T. 362, 367, 375). Mr. Korner described the appellant as having "nothing on the ball" (T. 364). He was of
the opinion that the appellant was suffering from a mental
illness (T. 368). He defined such a mental illness as being
where the appellant was unable to control his impulses
(T. 365). He did not attempt at any time to ascertain
whether the appellant knew the difference between right
and wrong (T. 395, 396) and could not say whether the
appellant was aware of what he was doing at the time he
killed and raped his victim (T. 396). Mr. Korner did not
perform a complete I.Q. test on the appellant, but only gave
the oral part of the Vvrechsler Bellvue Test and based upon
that, concluded the appellant was feeble minded (T. 364).
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A psychologist from the Utah State Mental Hospital
testified as to performing a complete I.Q. test and personality integration test. He also gave additional psychological tests to the appellant. He determined the appellant
to have an I.Q. on the verbal test of 94 and on the full scale
test of 81. He characterized the appellant's condition, based
upon his testing, as being one of "mild mental deficiency"
(T. 412, 413). Preceding the trial, the court appointed
three psychiatrists to examine the appellant. They were
Carl H. Kivler, M.D. (R. 7), Louis G. Moench (R. 27) and
C. H. Hardin Branch (R. 43). Dr. Kivler was the State's
nominee and Drs. Branch and Moench were appointed at
the request of the appellant (R. 5). Dr. Kivler and Dr.
Moench testified at the trial, but Dr. Branch was not called.
Dr. Kivler testified that he examined the appellant on several occasions during the month of November, 1961. He
characterized the appellant's mental capabilities as being
"mentally retarded in a degree as mild" (T. 421). He was
of the opinion that the appellant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of trial and at the time
of the commission of the crime (T. 423). He found no
indication of psychosis and was further of the opinion that
the appellant knew the nature and quality of his acts and
was capable of controlling his emotions (T. 424, 425). Dr.
Moench, also a psychiatrist, testified that upon examination
of the appellant, he concluded that the appellant's condition was one of "mild mental retardation" (T. 435). He
also was of the opinion that the appellant knew the difference between right and wrong, could understand the
charges against him, could control his impulses and knew
the nature and seriousness of his actions (T. 437,438). Additional evidence from various lay witnesses was received,
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showing the appellant's condition, his background, and his
general functioning in the community. Based upon the
above evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The appellant's petition for a writ of coram vobis alleged
the appointment of the three physicians (P. 4). The appellant further alleged that prior to trial that Dr. Moench,
by letter, suggested that Drs. Branch and Kivler compare
their testimony prior to trial to insure uniformity. The
appellant argued that the conduct of Dr. Moench in sending the letter to the other doctors was prejudicial and warranted a new trial (T. 5). No claim or allegation was made
in the petitioner's complaint that he was denied due process
of law. The affidavit of Mr. Korner was attached which
was generally in accordance with the petitioner's complaint. Neither the affidavit nor the complaint alleged that
there was in fact any collusion between the doctors to reach
a result other than that which they in fact believed to be
true or that the doctors had consulted with one another
prior to trial for the purposes of presenting a united front or,
further, that the doctors had not, when they testified, actually believed their testimony. Nor was there any evidence
offered at the petitioner's coram vobis hearing which would
support such a conclusion. At the coram vobis hearing, Dr.
Kivler testified that he had examined the appellant approximately five to six times prior to testifying at the trial
( R. 8). He testified that he had received a letter from Dr.
Moench, the contents of which he did not particularly recall, but thought it contained Dr. Moench's evaluation of
the case ( R. 9) . He testified that he received Dr. Moench's
letter subsequent to his having made his own evaluation and
having reached his own decision as to the appellant's condition ( R. 9) and that from his recollection Dr. Moench
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was generally in agreement with his evaluation (R. 11).
Dr. Kivler did not change his opinion subsequent to receiving Dr. Moench's letter and made no changes in his report concerning the appellant's condition. He made no
effort or attempt to contact Dr. Moench subsequent to receiving the letter from him, but merely filed what he had
received (R. 18). The communication from Dr. Moench
had no effect upon his diagnosis ( R. 20) .
The letter which Dr. Moench sent, which was accompanied by his analysis, was a copy of a clinical note to Dr.
Hardin Branch. That letter (defendant's Exhibit "B")
was received into evidence at the collateral hearing and
merely suggested that Dr. Branch might find his conclusions helpful and that if Dr. Branch had any serious disagreements that Dr. Moench would like to hear from Dr.
Branch. No communication of any disagreement was received by Dr. Moench from Dr. Branch. At the coram
vobis hearing, Dr. Moench testified that he submitted copies
of his report to Dr. Kivler and Dr. Branch and that hereceived from Dr. Branch a copy of Mr. Korner's psychological evaluation. He testified that the receipt of information
from Dr. Branch did not change his opinion nor did it differ
substantially from his conclusions (R. 36). He had made
his own independent, historical evaluation of the appellant
(R. 36). Prior to trial, he had extensive conversation with
the defense, but none with the prosecution (R. 38) . The
only other communications he had with either Drs. Branch
or Kivler was the exchange by mail with Dr. Kivler of the
report Dr. Kivler had made, which Moench said had no influence on his opinion ( R. 40--42) . Dr. Moench testified
that the only individual who had approached him in an
attempt to influence his opinion was Mr. Korner and that
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he disagreed with Mr. Korner and told him at the time he
did not support Mr. Korner's conclusions ( R. 41).
Dr. Hardin Branch testified at the collateral hearing that
he did not testify at the original trial, and that the only communication he had with Dr. Moench was the letter from
Moench to him on the 30th of October 1961, with the
accompanying reports. He testified that he examined the
appellant himself and made an independent psychological
evaluation (R. 49, 50). He stated that Dr. Korner had done
some psychological testing on the appellant at his request.
Prior to trial, Dr. Branch had conversations with the defense ( R. 53) . In response to questions from the appellant's
counsel as to whether there was a psychiatric difference between the terms "mild" or "moderate" as they may relate
to a mental deficiency, he testified that they had no technical specificity, but were lay terms which may be used in
identifying varying degrees of deficiency. He testified that
it was common among psychiatrists, when called to testify
as experts, to define amongst themselves areas of agreement
or disagreement (R. 55).
Mr. Korner did not testify at the collateral hearing, nor
is there any evidence that his affidavit was received by the
court. It is noteworthy that Mr. Korner in his affidavit indicates that the letter from Dr. Moench had been exhibited
to Father Roger Wood of St. Mary's Episcopal Church of
Provo, Utah.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CORAM VOBIS SINCE:
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT ANY OF THE
PSYCHIATRISTS WHO EXAMINED THE PETITIONER
WERE OF ANY DIFFERENT OPINION THAN THAT
GIVEN AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL TRIAL NOR
WAS THERE ANY SHOWING OF PERJURY, COLLUSION
OR MISCONDUCT.
B. THE PROVISIONS OF 77-24-17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, WERE COMPLIED WITH AT THE ORIGINAL TRIAL.
C. THERE IS NO SHOWING OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD WARRANT THE COURT
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.
D. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT NEWLY DISCOVERED SO AS
TO WARRANT RELIEF BY CORAM VOBIS.

A. The evidence offered at the petitioner's hearing for
relief from the original judgment in no way demonstrated
that either Dr. Carl H. Kivler or Dr. Louis G. Moench, the
psychiatrists who testified at the appellant's trial, gave any
perjured testimony, acted in collusion or otherwise testified
contrary to their actual findings. Dr. Kivler, who made the
most extensive examination of the appellant ( R. 8), had
reached his own decision evaluating the appellant's case
prior to the time he received a copy of a letter from Dr.
Moench to Dr. Branch or any information as to Dr.
Moench's evaluation ( R. 9) . He indicated that he did not
change his opinion after he received Dr. Moench's letter
and that his diagnosis generally was in agreement with Dr.
Moench ( R. 11, 14) . He further testified that he made no
changes in his report, nor did he attempt to contact Dr.
Moench. The evidence demonstrates that Dr. Kivler made
an independent evaluation and did not engage in any im-
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proper activity. The testimony of Dr. Moench was similar
in that he indicated that he did not change his evaluation
or opinion as a result of communications with Dr. Branch
and that Dr. Branch's conclusions did not differ substantially from his (R. 35, 36). Further, Dr. Branch and Dr.
Moench communicated extensively with the defense counsel and, therefore, there was no attempt to suppress or hide
any evidence. The only person who attempted to influence
any of the opinions of any of the doctors was Mr. I j a Korner
who, by virtue of his own affidavit and disclosure of the
letter from Dr. Moench to Dr. Branch, to an Episcopalian
minister, appears to be more than professionally involved
in the case. It would appear that Mr. Komer has gone
beyond the realm of psychology and has concerned himself
with the political and social consequences of the situation
to the point that he has lost any objectivity. Finally, Dr.
Branch testified that it was not uncommon for psychiatrists
to define terms and communicate among themselves in an
effort to better understand the problem. The appellant's
argument that this somehow is improper, is ridiculous. It
would be like advocating that each member of the Supreme
Court should write a separate opinion without ever having
discussed the case with any other member of the Supreme
Court for fear that there might be some exchange of ideas.
The appellant argues that an independent psychiatric
evaluation is essential to due process. It is worth noting that
the appellant's original petition in the trial court did not
recite due process as any grounds for relief. However, a
number of states adopt procedures which contemplate the
use of psychiatric teams or batteries. In People v. Pearson,
41 Cal. App. 2d 614, 107 P.2d 463, the court apparently
approved a joint psychiatric report signed by appointed
alienists. Many state procedures involve hospitalization and
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evaluation by a team. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal LawJ Section
940(5); United States v. EverettJ 146 Fed. Supp. 54. Present federal procedure in the District of Columbia may, in
the case of an indigent criminal, involve a 90-day mental
observation procedure at St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Shadoen,
Law and Tactics in Federal Criminal Cases (1964), page
245. Shadoen notes that at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, a staff
conference is held sometime during the final two to three
weeks of the accused's stay which is "the primary diagnostic
tool utilized by the hospital." Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry
( 1952), page 35, also notes that a period of hospital observation may be helpful in doubtful cases in determining
criminal responsibility. Since this is commonly a team procedure, it can hardly be claimed that it denied due process
of law. Psychiatrists are primarily attempting to determine
the mental condition of the appellant under admittedly
difficult circumstances. The use of a variety of techniques,
analyses and disciplines is probably most helpful in attempting to understand the true condition of an accused. Hardman, The Case for Eclecticism, 10 Crime and Delinquency
201 ( 1964). It would be absurd to say that due process required that standard diagnostic techniques and practices
not be used when the primary purpose for their use is to
determine the mental condition of an individual.
Persuasive of the fact that comparing notes and using
other disciplines does not violate due process is the fact that
the President has provided in the Manual for Courts-MartialJ 1951 for just such a form of psychiatric evaluation of
an accused charged with an offense triable by court-martial.
MCM, 1951, p. 200-223; Executive Order 10214 ( 1951 )
Truman. There is no merit, based on the evidence of this
case, to the appellant's petition.
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B. It is submitted that contrary to the appellant's contention, the provisions of 77-24-17, Utah Code Annotated
1953, were complied with and that there was no variance
from the statutory requirements which would warrant the
relief sought. 77-24-17 provides that upon notice of the
defense of insanity, the court must appoint and select "two
alienists" to examine the defendant and investigate his
sanity. The statute further provides:
"It is the duty of the alienists so selected and appointed
to examine the defendant and investigate his sanity,
and to testify whenever summoned, in any proceeding
in which the sanity of the defendant is in question."
The statute further provides that any alienist appointed
may be called by either party or by the court. In the insant
case, the trial court appointed three alienists to examine
the appellant. Nothing in the statute prohibits the alienists
which are appointed from examining the defendant jointly,
considering the findings of each other, or otherwise using
the benefit of diagnosis and conclusions of other experts.
In fact, the statute would seem to contemplate just such
action. The statute uses the plural "alienists" and indicates
it is their duty to "examine the defendant and investigate
his sanity." The investigation of insanity may well involve
the obtaining of historical information, the consultation
with other physicians and the use of any other appropriate
discipline which may enable the alienists to arrive at a conclusion. Contrary to the assertions of the appellant, the
statute does neither expressly nor impliedly contemplate
that an appointed alienist must, independent of his fellow
appointees and without the right of consultation or discussion, examine and reach a conclusion. This Act was passed
in 1935 and was based upon the American Law Institute's
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Code of Criminal Procedure. Laws of Utah 1935, Chapter 122, Section 1. See American Law Institute Code of
Criminal Procedure (1930); IV and V Utah Bar Bulletin
( 1935) . There is nothing in the legislative history of the
Act or in the archives of the American Law Institute which
would lead to the conclusion that the framers contemplated
that appointed alienists would not be free to consult with
one another, use one another's discoveries and endeavor to
iron out any differences between one another which would
lead to a correct determination of an accused's mental state.
Indeed, many states and the federal government were using
methods of a similar nature to that followed in the instant
situation. It must be concluded that the major premise
upon which the appellant bases his claim for relief is faulty
and that 77-24-17 was in fact complied with.
C. The testimony offered at the hearing on the petition
for a writ of corum vobis demonstrated that each of the
doctors who were appointed to examine the appellant testified at the trial as to their personal beliefs based upon a
thorough professional investigation. The only evidence
which could be deemed newly discovered would be the
letter from Dr. Moench to Dr. Branch and the possible
knowledge that some of the examining physicians had access to reports and conclusions of the other physicians. It is
clear that this is not sufficient evidence as will support a writ
of coram nobis or coram vobis. 1
1

The writ of coram nobis and coram vobis are in fact the same writ. The dis~inction at common law was dependent upon the jurisdiction of the court issuIng the writ. The writ of coram nobis was issued by the King's Bench, whereas
the writ of coram vobis was issued by the Court of Common Pleas. See Frank,
Corum Nobis, Section 1.02 ( 1953) ; Rolle, Henry-Abridgement ( 1668) 746,
747. The correct designation in Utah is writ of coram nobis. Neal v. Beckstead, 3 U.2d 403, 285 P.2d 129 ( 1955) ; State v. Woodard, 108 U. 390, 160
P.2d432 (1945).
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In State v. Woodard, this court stated:
"A writ of coram nobis, where available, seeks to
obtain a review of a judgment on the ground that certain mistakes of fact have occurred which were unknown to the court and to the parties affected, and that
but for such mistakes the judgment would not have
been rendered. 31 Am. Jur. on Judgments, Sec. 802;
State v. Richardson, 291 Mo. 566, 237 S. W. 765;
Alexander v. State, 20 Wyo. 241, 123 P. 68, Ann. Cas.
1915A, 1282. * * *"
In Ward v. Turner, 12 U.2d 310,366 P.2d 72 ( 1961), the
petitioner sought a special writ from the Third District
Court. The court in rejecting the petition stated:
"We conclude that the judgment must be reversed
for lack of substantial evidence which would reasonably indicate that had the evidence * * * been disclosed to defendant before trial, he would probably
have been acquitted."
The applicable standard appears to be that a writ of
coram nobis will lie if the evidence which is claimed to be
newly discovered is of sufficient consequence that it would
be highly probable that had the evidence been disclosed,
the jury would not have returned the same verdict. An
analysis of the evidence in the instant case shows that it is
far below the standard required for relief by coram nobis.
The evidence in no way would have affected the result
among reasonable men. The evidence did not tend to support the appellant's contention at trial and could have had
little effect, if any, on the conduct of the trial itself.
D. It is a well established rule that a writ of coram nobis
will not lie if the so-called newly discovered evidence could
have been discovered by the use of reasonable diligence.
In the insant case, defense counsel had numerous contacts
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with the psychiatrists involved (defendant's Exhibit "A").
Appellant could, if he had so desired, called Dr. Branch at
his original trial. The evidence relating to the communications between the examining physicians was readily available and a few questions more or less could easily have
elicited the information. Thus, in State v. Woodard, 108
U. 390, 160 P.2d 432 ( 1945), this court observed:
"* * * However, for a party to be entitled to this writ
it must appear that the failure to present the facts to
the court was not due to any negligence or fault of the
party seeking the writ. As stated in 31 Am. Jur. on
Judgments, Sec. 806:
'It is essential to the availability of the remedy of
coram nobis or coram vobis that the mistake of fact
relied upon for relief was unknown to the applicant
at the time of the trial, and could not by the exercise
of reasonable diligence have been discovered by him
in time to have been presented to the court, unless
he was prevented from so doing by duress, fear, or
other sufficient cause, so that it was by no negligence
or other fault of his that the matter was not made to
appear at the former trial. * * *'
See also State v. Richardson, supra; Alexander v.
State, supra; State v. Boyd, 117 Neb. 320, 220 N. W.
281,58 A. L. R. 1283.
"In the instant case the mistake of fact upon which
the appellant relies is the value of the property stolen.
The articles stolen were one Seiberling 6-ply heavy
duty 625-16 air cushion tire, rim and tube and two
Gates Valee tires, 6-ply heavy duty 625-16 rims and
tires. It is apparent that these articles are of the type
the value of which was readily ascertainable. The
value of these articles at the time they were stolen
could have been discovered with very little effort on
the part of the defendant. His failure to do so and to
call the court's attention to the fact that their value
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was less than $50, if that were so at that time, was
clearly negligence and therefore the court did not err
in refusing to grant the writ."
The same rule is applicable in the instant case since with
very little effort the information which the appellant contends is newly discovered could have been discovered at
trial. The evidence was in existence at the time of trial, was
within knowledge of persons who testified at the trial or
within the possession of persons with whom the appellant's
counsel had discussed the case. Consequently, it does not
appear that the so-called newly discovered evidence was in
fact evidence which could not have been discovered with
the use of reasonable diligence. The petition for coram
nobis was properly denied.
CONCLUSION
The appellant was given every consideration at the time
of trial, was afforded a full review on appeal by this court,
and certiorari has been denied by the United States Supreme Court. The petition for extraordinary relief now
before this court on appeal is merely the common delaying
tactic normally associated with cases where the capital
penalty has been imposed. There is no merit to the appeal.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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